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INTRODUCTION 
After the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 
11, 2001, the balance of power between the executive and legislative 
branches of government in this country shifted.1  President Bush’s 
response to the attacks included substantial steps to expand the 
executive’s unilateral authority in the arenas of international affairs 
and war powers.2  Both President Bush and President Obama have 
extended executive power and then staunchly protected their 
expansion of authority from limitation by the legislative and judicial 
branches.3  Further, Bush’s use of presidential signing statements to 
                                                 
 1. See Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen 
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1 (stating that President Bush  
“has taken what scholars call a more expansive view of his role than any commander 
in chief in decades”); David G. Savage, Administration Stays Course in Legal War, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A13 (providing an overview of the Bush administration’s 
expansion of executive power). 
 2. See Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers,  
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1941 (2007) (citing the Bush administration’s 
extraordinary rendition program and the warrantless wire tapping program as 
examples of controversial post-September 11th expansions of executive power).  
Another well known example is President Bush’s use of the enemy combatant 
designation to avoid legal protections and international rights for certain detainees.  
See infra note 53 (discussing the line of cases addressing the rights of Guantanamo 
Bay detainees). 
 3. The application of the state secrets privilege was an early example of the 
Obama administration maintaining the expansion of executive power initiated by the 
Bush administration during the war on terrorism.  Peter Finn, Justice Dept. Uses “State 
Secrets” Defense; Obama Backs Bush Decision on Rendition Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 
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undermine legislative intent suggests that the executive’s power to 
avoid legislative input may be virtually limitless.4 
The Supreme Court’s 2008 Medellín v. Texas5 decision appeared to 
be an example of the judiciary reversing that trend by countering an 
additional assertion of executive power.  In Medellín, the Court 
rejected the President’s efforts to force Texas to comply with an 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision ordering 
reconsideration of Jose Medellín’s original conviction.6  However, 
while the Court facially limited the executive’s power in that instance, 
it also opened a new avenue for the President to exercise his 
authority with regard to treaty interpretation. 
Since its earliest days, the Court has recognized a distinction 
between treaty terms that are automatically binding (“self-executing”) 
and those that require additional legislative attention (“non-self-
executing”).7  However, early rulings were inconsistent and created 
confusion in applying this distinction.8  In Medellín, the Court 
attempted to clarify this area of the law by endorsing a strict  
text-based approach to treaty interpretation.9  Relying on that 
approach, the majority asserted the novel concept that a treaty term 
is not domestically enforceable without further action unless the 
language in the treaty clearly indicates that the parties intended the 
term to be self-executing.10 
                                                 
2009, at A4; see also Frost, supra note 2, at 1931–32 (describing how plaintiffs in suits 
challenging the use of the state secrets privilege argue that the executive undermines 
the judicial branch’s role in determining the legality of state action by using the 
privilege). 
 4. See Phillip J. Cooper, Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments:  The President 
as Judge, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 253, 255 (2007) (arguing that signing statements 
have developed into a tool to expand executive power, limit legislative authority, and 
constrain the judiciary). 
 5. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 6. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ holding 
regarding Medellín and numerous other Mexican citizens in similar circumstances). 
 7. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (finding that a treaty 
term is only domestically binding when the term operates without the need for 
additional legislation), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman,  
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty 
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1272 (2002) (“[B]uilding on the premise of Foster v. 
Neilson, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between what have come to be 
known as self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.”). 
 8. See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (addressing the pre-Medellín 
history of judicial interpretation of self-executing treaties). 
 9. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358–60 (applying a text-based approach to the 
interpretation of the language “undertakes to comply” in the U.N. Charter). 
 10. See id. at 1359 n.5 (asserting that “the ‘undertakes to comply’ language 
confirms that further action to give effect to an ICJ judgment was contemplated”). 
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This Comment argues that this approach to treaty interpretation 
creates a presumption of non-self-execution and effectively grants the 
executive the final say in deciding whether to enforce treaty 
obligations within the United States, thereby increasing executive 
power.11  This Comment further argues that this increase in executive 
power could undermine the constitutional role of legislators in the 
treaty-making process.12 
Additionally, this Comment uses a hypothetical scenario to explore 
how the imbalance of power created by Medellín may lead to a 
situation where senators have standing to sue in their institutional 
capacity.13  This is more challenging than it initially appears because 
legislators have more hurdles to overcome than private parties.14  
However, if senators can show that the executive’s interpretation of a 
treaty is inconsistent with their intent, they could claim that their 
votes to ratify the treaty were rendered completely ineffective, thus 
establishing a claim of vote nullification.15  Vote nullification, an issue 
not often addressed by the Supreme Court, is the only injury that the 
Court has recognized as sufficient to create legislative standing.16  
Further, the senators must show that the issue is a legal one instead of 
a matter that is better suited for the political branches of the 
government.17 
Thus, this Comment discusses the implications of Medellín on treaty 
interpretation, separation of powers, and legislative standing.  Part I 
of this Comment discusses the development of the distinction 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and the 
evolution of legislative standing.  Part II presents a scenario raised by 
the Medellín holding where the executive could refuse to enforce a 
treaty obligation based on his unilateral interpretation that the 
relevant treaty terms were non-self-executing.  Part III argues that the 
                                                 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (recognizing legislators’ 
standing to challenge executive action based on the executive’s undermining of the 
effectiveness of the legislators’ votes). 
 14. See infra Part IV (considering the path to justiciability for legislators and the 
need for a concrete injury to create standing). 
 15. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the unique standing issues faced by legislators). 
 16. See David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
205, 214 (2001) (identifying Coleman as the one instance where the Court recognized 
an institutional injury as the basis for a suit by members of Congress). 
 17. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (setting forth the criteria 
necessary to avoid nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine). 
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Court created a presumption of non-self-execution in the Medellín 
decision and explains how that presumption creates new executive 
powers.  Part IV argues that if a president’s interpretation is 
inconsistent with Congress’s action on the treaty, members of 
Congress would have standing to sue in their institutional capacity.  
Additionally, this Part provides alternate recommendations to 
prevent the President from asserting unchecked power in treaty 
interpretation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Medellín Emphasized the Distinction Between Self-Executing Treaties 
and Non-Self-Executing Treaties 
In Medellín, the Roberts Court focused on two principle issues.  
First, the Court considered whether a judgment by the ICJ was 
enforceable as domestic law in a state court.18  Second, the Court 
addressed whether a presidential order enforcing the ICJ’s judgment 
preempted state procedural rules.19 
In 1993, three hours after his arrest for the rape and murder of two 
teenagers, Jose Ernesto Medellín confessed to the crimes.20  Between 
his arrest and confession, Texas police officers did not inform 
Medellín of his right to notify the Mexican consulate about his 
detention.21  A Texas district court convicted Medellín of capital 
murder and sentenced him to death for his crimes.22 
While Medellín was unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in 
various United States courts,23 the ICJ considered a claim brought by 
Mexico against the United States pursuant to multiple international 
agreements.24  The ICJ determined that Medellín and other Mexican 
nationals were entitled to the review and reconsideration of their 
                                                 
 18. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1354. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying 
Medellín’s application for a Certificate of Appealability); Medellín v. Cockrell,  
No. Civ.A. H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *28 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2003) (granting 
a motion for summary judgment requested by the Director of the Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division). 
 24. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 24 
(Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena] (“The present proceedings have been brought by 
Mexico against the United States on the basis of the Vienna Convention, and of the 
Optional Protocol . . . .”). 
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state-court convictions because of the United States’s failure to 
inform the Mexican consulate of the Mexican nationals’ detention.25  
Following the ICJ decision, the executive branch ordered state courts 
to give effect to that decision.26  Based on the decision and the 
subsequent executive memorandum, Medellín filed a second 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in a Texas court.27  The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the application, and Medellín 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.28 
The Court specifically considered aspects of three treaties in the 
Medellín decision to decide whether the ICJ judgment was 
enforceable domestically.  First, the Court addressed the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).29  The VCCR requires 
arresting countries to inform the consular of the detainee’s home 
country of the detention upon the request of the detainee.30   
The Court then considered the VCCR’s Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional 
Protocol).31  Under the Optional Protocol, the United States 
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ for all claims arising out of 
the VCCR.32  Finally, the Court turned to the United Nations Charter, 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 71–73. 
 26. Specifically, in a memorandum to Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, 
President Bush stated that “the United States will discharge its international 
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena] by 
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles 
of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Medellín v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
 27. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 
78, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 31. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353. 
 32. See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
art. I, Apr. 24, 1964, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (providing that disputes 
stemming from the VCCR are within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and any 
party to the dispute and Optional Protocol may bring a claim in the ICJ); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 903 (1987) 
(stating that countries may submit a dispute to the ICJ where the countries are 
“bound by an agreement providing for the submission to the Court of a category of 
disputes that includes the dispute in question”).  The United States withdrew from 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ over general treaty and international law matters in 1986.  
Id. § 907 cmt. c.  The United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol on March 7, 2005 in light of the ICJ’s holding in Avena, thereby eliminating 
ICJ jurisdiction over the United States in future disputes arising from the VCCR.  
U.S. Dep’t of State, Announcement:  All Consular Notification Requirements 
Remain in Effect (2005), available at http:// travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html#. 
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specifically considering a number of articles within that document.33  
Article 92 of the U.N. Charter establishes the ICJ as the principal 
legal body within the United Nations.34  Article 94 states that each 
member of the United Nations “undertakes to comply” with any ICJ 
decision.35  The Statute of the International Court of Justice grants 
jurisdiction to the ICJ where any other treaty provides that the ICJ 
will be the source of dispute resolution.36 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that the ICJ judgment was not 
enforceable as federal law and that neither the judgment nor 
executive action could supersede a Texas law limiting successive 
petitions for habeas corpus.37  The Court held that the ICJ decision 
did not have automatic legal effect in the United States because the 
various treaties did not make the enforcement of an ICJ decision 
binding federal law and because Congress had not passed 
implementing legislation.38  Specifically, the Court determined that 
the “undertakes to comply” language in the U.N. Charter only 
committed the member nations to take additional political action to 
comply with future ICJ decisions.39  The Court relied upon the 
treaties’ text and the enforcement structure within the Optional 
Protocol and ICJ process to find that ICJ decisions were not legally 
binding.40  The Court also ruled that the President cannot 
                                                 
 33. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353–54. 
 34. U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 35. Id. art. 94, para. 1. 
 36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 1, June 26, 1945,  
59 Stat. 1055, 1059, 3 Bevans 1153, 1186. 
 37. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1353 (specifying the Avena judgment and the 
Presidential Memorandum as being subordinate to Texas state law).  The Texas law 
in question limited subsequent applications for habeas corpus to applications that 
asserted claims and issues based on legal or factual bases not available at the time of 
the original application and that claimed “no rational juror could have found the 
applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” or that claimed “no rational juror 
would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues.”   
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (repealed 2009). 
 38. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 39. See id. at 1358 (agreeing with the President’s amicus brief argument).  The 
Court went on to say that the language in the U.N. Charter confirmed that 
something more was necessary for an ICJ decision to be domestically binding.  Id. at 
1359 n.5. 
 40. See id. at 1358–60 (reviewing specific language within the relevant treaties and 
determining that the language did not convey an intent that the terms be  
self-executing). 
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domestically execute a non-self-executing treaty without 
congressional approval.41 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, wrote an 
extensive dissent, arguing (in part) that the majority should have 
relied on the Supremacy Clause and the case law applying that clause 
to treaties.42  First, Breyer argued that the text-dependent approach 
was flawed because the dispositive language the majority sought is 
rarely available in treaties.43  Second, Breyer stated that precedential 
case law on the subject required using a context-specific approach, 
considering factors such as:  the language of the relevant treaties, the 
legal and practical implications of a decision in either direction, and 
any concerns from the political branches regarding the treaty terms.44  
Justice Breyer applied this approach to the relevant treaty terms in 
Medellín and found that this application resulted in the treaty being 
self-executing and the ICJ decision being domestically enforceable.45 
On August 5, 2008, the Supreme Court refused to temporarily stay 
Medellín’s death sentence, and shortly thereafter Texas officials 
carried out the execution.46  Since the Medellín decision, scholars have 
debated the implications of the holding in a wide variety of fields 
ranging from international obligations to the death penalty in the 
United States.47 
                                                 
 41. See id. at 1371 (“[T]he authority of the President to represent the United 
States before such bodies speaks to the President’s international responsibilities, not 
any unilateral authority to create domestic law.”). 
 42. See id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “look[ed] for 
the wrong thing . . . using the wrong standard . . . in the wrong place”). 
 43. See id. at 1381 (“[T]he absence or presence of language in a treaty about a 
provision’s self-execution proves nothing at all.”). 
 44. See id. at 1382–89 (considering seven factors as part of the context-specific 
approach to determine whether the relevant treaty terms were self-executing). 
 45. Id. at 1383. 
 46. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas, WASH. POST, Aug. 
6, 2008, at A6 (chronicling the last-minute stay requests and execution of Jose 
Medellín). 
 47. See generally Opinio Juris, Medellin:  An Insta-Symposium, http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/medellin-an-insta-symposium/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2010) (discussing the implications of the Medellín holding within a broad array of 
legal fields including treaty obligations, the death penalty in the United States, 
habeas corpus rights, and the role of the legislature). 
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B. Medellín Raises a New Separation of Powers Issue by Questioning 
Which Branch of the Government Has the Strongest Role in Treaty 
Enforcement 
The Roberts Court considered Medellín in the middle of an 
ongoing conflict over how much power each branch of the 
government should hold, particularly over national security issues.  
President Bush sought to extend his power in a variety of ways after 
the September 11th attacks, and this debate continues as President 
Obama has maintained that trend in some respects.48  The executive, 
however, is not the only branch responsible for this shift in power.  
Congress plays an important role in determining the strength of the 
executive.49  One example of Congress deferring significant power to 
the executive was the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) in 2001.50  By authorizing President Bush to use almost 
unlimited power to engage in the undefined war on terrorism, 
Congress ceded much of its role in the oversight of executive action 
taken under the auspices of executing that war.51 
The third party involved in controlling the strength of the 
executive is the judicial branch.  Disputes between the President and 
the courts over the executive’s role after September 11th are well 
chronicled.52  At times, the judicial branch, particularly the Supreme 
Court, has played an active and important role in limiting the scope 
of the executive’s power.53  However, in other cases, courts have 
                                                 
 48. See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut & Scott Wilson, Obama Reports Gains Made Against 
Al Qaeda, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2009, at A12 (recognizing that Obama has been 
criticized for continuing Bush’s policies on wiretapping and rendition). 
 49. See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization:  Why Today’s 
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
395, 396 (2009) (considering the role of Congress in determining executive power 
and arguing that traditionally “presidential power is largely defined by the tug and 
pull between Congress and the White House”). 
 50. See Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (allowing the 
executive to take military action in response to the September 11th attacks). 
 51. See Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair the “Broken Branch”?,  
89 B.U. L. REV. 765, 771 (2009) (arguing that the Bush administration used the 
AUMF to justify a variety of programs, even against the will of Congress). 
 52. See Savage, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing the legal battle surrounding the 
expansion of executive power by the Bush administration). 
 53. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (establishing that 
enemy combatants were entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559–60, 594 (2006) (rejecting the Bush administration’s 
claim that the Detainee Treatment Act deprived the Court of jurisdiction over a 
foreign national detained in Guantanamo Bay and rejecting the military 
commissions established by the Act as unconstitutional); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,  
542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that due process requires that American citizens 
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granted the President broad authority to carry out the war on 
terrorism.54  Further, courts have avoided involvement in certain 
balance of power disputes between the legislature and the executive.55  
This hesitancy is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence dating 
back to Marbury v. Madison56 and is best reflected through the political 
question doctrine, as well as other theories regarding a limited 
judiciary.57 
Within the broad academic debate over the impact of Medellín is a 
discussion about how its holding affects the balance of power in the 
United States between the executive and legislative branches.  Some 
commentators argue that Medellín slowed the trend of power shifting 
in favor of the executive by strengthening an important legislative 
check on treaty enforcement.58  Other scholars claim that Medellín 
reflects the judicial branch’s attempt to retain power against both the 
legislative and executive branches and other outside influences.59  
                                                 
held as enemy combatants be given an opportunity to challenge their detention);  
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo:   
The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (arguing that the Boumediene 
holding rejected a significant portion of the Bush administration’s antiterrorist 
strategy). 
 54. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with 
the government’s assertion that the state secrets privilege prevented El-Masri from 
bringing a suit against the government claiming that he had been tortured and 
illegally detained); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security 
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1250–51 (2007) (discussing the Bush 
administration’s use of the state secrets privilege as a legal tactic to avoid judicial 
review of executive actions); see also FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.  
110-261, § 802, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468 (2008) (requiring that any court proceeding 
addressing an entity’s cooperation with the government’s wiretap program be 
dismissed upon the Attorney General’s certification). 
 55. See infra notes 172–182 and accompanying text (discussing the political 
question doctrine). 
 56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 57. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES  
63 (2d ed. 2002) (identifying the political question doctrine as a limit on judicial 
interference with the other branches of government, particularly in the realm of 
foreign policy); see also John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing,  
42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993) (arguing that standing is vital to preserving the 
limited role of the courts). 
 58. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs:  Subnational Incorporation of 
International Human Rights Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 415 
(2008) (recognizing the Medellín holding as a limitation on executive power relating 
to human rights). 
 59. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1131, 1136 (2008) (arguing that Medellín exemplified Justice Kennedy’s recent 
attempts to “uphold the prerogatives of the Supreme Court”). 
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Finally, some even argue that Medellín raised more questions than it 
resolved due to the narrowness of the holding.60 
C. Medellín is the Latest in an Ongoing—Albeit Small—Series of Decisions 
that Address the Treaty-Making Process and the Distinction Between  
Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties 
While drafting the Constitution, the Founders divided the treaty-
making process between the legislative and executive branches.   
The Treaty Clause placed the power to make treaties in the hands of 
the President, but required the executive to obtain the advice of the 
Senate and the consent of at least two-thirds of the Senate’s members 
present at the time of the vote.61 
Today, the official treaty-making process remains consistent.62  
However, recently, the executive has relied increasingly on a tool 
called an “executive agreement” instead of treaties to finalize 
negotiations with other nations.63  An executive agreement is a 
unilateral agreement between the American executive and a foreign 
executive outside the constitutional treaty-making process.64  
Empirical evidence published in 2009 indicates that executives tend 
to favor executive agreements over treaties when efficiency is the 
most important concern.65  Despite the rise of executive agreements, 
                                                 
 60. See, e.g., Mary D. Hallerman, Medellin v. Texas:  The Treaties that Bind,  
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 797, 814–20 (2009) (claiming that Medellín’s impact may lead to 
unresolved questions regarding the United States’s international relationships, treaty 
language, presidential powers, and the states’ role in international treaty making). 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President “shall have Power, 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of 
the Senators present concur”). 
 62. See Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End:  The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Law Making in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1278–86 (2008) (explaining that 
the reasons for the Treaty Clause’s contents were the views that senators would serve 
as presidential advisors and regional interests would be protected, and arguing that 
both reasons are presently irrelevant). 
 63. See GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF 
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 51 (2009) (“94 percent of international agreements 
completed by American presidents today are executive agreements rather than 
treaties.”). 
 64. See id. at 30 (describing executive agreements as treaties formed without the 
advice and consent of the Senate). 
 65. See id. at 67 (arguing that the use of executive agreements since 1949 
indicates a concern for institutional efficiency rather than a desire for political 
evasion). 
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treaties entered pursuant to Article II of the Constitution still play an 
important role in modern foreign policy.66 
The Supremacy Clause suggests that all treaties made under the 
Treaty Clause have the same legal weight as the Constitution and the 
laws of Congress.67  However, the 1829 Foster v. Neilson68 Supreme 
Court decision introduced the concept that there were two different 
types of treaties, some that were domestically binding and some that 
were not.69  Foster was a land dispute case, where Foster and his 
partner Elam sought to eject Neilson from land in present-day 
Louisiana.70  The Spanish government had sold the land to Jayme 
Joydra and, following a number of transactions, Foster and Elam 
eventually purchased the land from another party.71  Neilson argued 
that Foster and Elam could not own the land because the Spanish 
government did not have the authority to convey the land to Joydra 
based on treaties that eventually assigned the land to the United 
States.72 
In Foster, the Court determined that the two treaties at issue 
required the United States to recognize the Spanish transaction.73  
However, the Court held that unless Congress had implemented the 
relevant article of the second treaty, the required recognition could 
not be applied by the courts.74  Thus, Foster was the first case to 
distinguish between self-executing treaties and non-self-executing 
                                                 
 66. See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments:  Treaties as 
Signaling Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440, 460 (2005) (relying on quantitative 
models to indicate that treaties are still relevant and often a politically valuable 
indication that the executive intends to adhere to the terms of the international 
agreement). 
 67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing that the “Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land”). 
 68. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 69. See id. at 314 (holding that a treaty has the same effect as legislation in courts 
when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision”). 
 70. Id. at 255. 
 71. Id. at 254–55. 
 72. Id. at 255. 
 73. Id. at 314–15; see also Carlos M. Vasquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v. 
Percheman:  Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 158–
69 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing the Court’s interpretation of the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso and the Adams-Onís Treaty). 
 74. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (holding that where a treaty requires a party 
to engage in a specific act, the requirement is directed at the legislature and is not 
judicially enforceable). 
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treaties.75  Specifically, the Foster Court recognized that in some 
situations, a treaty could operate without implementing legislation.76  
However, the Court also recognized that in other situations, such as 
the one raised in Foster, a treaty could not self-execute; instead, some 
entity had to effectuate the treaty terms.77  Beyond this distinction, 
the Court offered little clarification on the differences between  
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.78 
Four years later, in United States v. Percheman,79 the Court revisited 
the same treaty terms considered in Foster.80  In Percheman, the Court 
determined that the same treaty clause it had read as non-self-
executing in Foster was in fact self-executing.81  This reversal was based 
on a reading of the Spanish version of the treaty—in Foster, the Court 
only considered the English version—and a recognition that the 
English version of the treaty term was ambiguous.82  Percheman 
defined a self-executing treaty as one that achieves its goals “by force 
of the instrument itself.”83  The Court defined a non-self-executing 
treaty as one that specifically requires an additional legislative act.84 
Over the years since those holdings, lower courts have differed in 
how they defined a self-executing treaty.85  In Medellín, the Supreme 
                                                 
 75. See Carlos M. Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 702 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s statement that only treaties that 
operate themselves are applicable without legislative implementation created the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). 
 76. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (finding that a treaty that operates itself 
without the aid of legislation is equal to an act of the legislature). 
 77. See id. at 315 (relying on the treaty’s requirement that the land grants be 
“ratified and confirmed” to determine that some entity, specifically Congress, was 
being directed to act). 
 78. See Vasquez, supra note 73, at 165 (noting that the distinction “confounded” 
lower courts and even confused Justice Marshall, the author of the majority opinion 
in Foster, when he revisited it in a later case). 
 79. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 80. See id. at 89 (discussing the Foster Court’s review of the Adams-Onís Treaty). 
 81. See id. at 88–89 (holding that the ratification and confirmation enumerated 
within the treaty did not require further legislative action). 
 82. See id. at 89 (acknowledging that the Foster Court did not consider the 
Spanish version of the treaty); Vasquez, supra note 73, at 169–70 (arguing that the 
newly introduced Spanish version of the treaty “gave the Court some cover to 
reverse” the basis of the Foster holding and to determine that the treaty term was 
ambiguous). 
 83. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89. 
 84. Id.; see also Vasquez, supra note 73, at 171 (finding that the Percheman Court 
ruled that there must be an affirmative statement requiring an additional step for a 
treaty to be deemed non-self-executing). 
 85. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988)  
(“Very few courts, however, paid attention to Marshall’s invented distinction between 
self- and non-self-operative treaties until the end of the 19th century.”); Vasquez, 
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Court sought to clarify the difference between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties by defining those terms.  According to the 
Medellín Court, self-executing treaties become the law of the land as 
soon as they are ratified and are thus immediately enforceable.86   
In contrast, non-self-executing treaties require legislative 
implementation before they can be judicially enforceable within the 
United States.87 
The true impact of Medellín with regard to treaty interpretation is 
subject to substantial debate, and the questions surrounding  
self-execution and non-self-execution are far from resolved.  It is clear 
that Medellín advanced a narrow text-centered approach to treaty 
interpretation88 and rejected the presumption of self-execution 
promoted by a number of legal scholars.89  Some commentators argue 
that Medellín offered new guideposts for judicial treaty 
interpretation.90  Others argue that the implications of the Medellín 
holding were limited to the facts and did not substantially change the 
way that treaties are interpreted.91 
                                                 
supra note 75, at 704 (claiming that courts and commentators disagree over 
questions of how to determine the intent of parties). 
 86. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 n.2 (2008) (defining a self-
executing treaty as one that “has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon 
ratification”). 
 87. See id. (stating that a non-self-executing treaty is one that “does not by itself 
give rise to domestically enforceable federal law”). 
 88. See id. at 1358 (declaring that the text of the treaty is the starting point for 
any treaty interpretation). 
 89. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision established 
no presumption favoring self-execution or non-self-execution).  The Restatement 
explicitly identified a presumption of self-execution and legal scholars argued that, 
based on the Supremacy Clause and the Percheman holding, international treaties 
were presumptively self-executing unless the text of the treaty required an additional 
affirmative act.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111 reporter’s note 5 (1986) (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested 
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a 
strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the 
political branches.”); see, e.g., Vasquez, supra note 73, at 171 (identifying the 
“constitutional default rule” as the finding that treaties are self-executing). 
 90. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 530 (2008) (arguing that the Medellín decision reshaped the 
“legitimate sources that judges may use in treaty interpretation, the degree of their 
deference to U.S. executive branch positions, and the general canons (or default 
rules) to be followed when construing treaties”). 
 91. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 
624, 630 (2008) (arguing that the holding in Medellín does not change the consular 
notification process promoted by the VCCR and describing international law as an 
“interactive process”). 
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D. Legislative Standing Hinges on the Ability of a Legislator to Prove an 
Injury Sufficient to Satisfy Standing Requirements While Staying Clear of 
Separation of Powers Concerns 
As discussed in detail in Part III, Medellín raises concerns of an 
overextension of executive power.92  One of the limited avenues for 
the legislature to challenge such an extension of executive power is 
through the legal system.93  However, in order to succeed in court, 
legislators must satisfy multiple tests before getting to the merits of 
the issue, including:  meeting the traditional standing requirements,94 
clearing the increased burden of legislative standing,95 and avoiding 
the complications surrounding the political question doctrine.96 
Standing is one of the four main criteria that must be satisfied for a 
claim to be justiciable in federal court.97  If a claim is not justiciable, 
the court will reject the case without even considering the merits of 
                                                 
 92. See infra Part III (discussing how Medellín allows an executive broader leeway 
in determining whether to enforce a treaty domestically by creating a presumption of 
non-self-execution). 
 93. While courts are generally hesitant to intervene in a dispute between 
Congress and the executive until it is absolutely necessary, the judiciary has stepped 
in at times.  See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce,  
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (barring certain census survey techniques on the 
grounds that they were inconsistent with congressional power). 
 94. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 95. Compare Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939) (granting state 
legislators standing where executive action undermined the effectiveness of their 
vote), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (rejecting a claim of 
legislative standing on the grounds that the legislators did not suffer a sufficient 
injury). 
 96. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (recognizing that certain issues 
could render a claim nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine). 
 97. See Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrointe, Congress Goes to Court:   
The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 214 
(2001) (addressing threshold requirements for access to the judicial system).   
The other three criteria are mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.  
Id.  The doctrine of mootness establishes that a case will not be heard if the “issues 
presented are no longer ‘live’” or the parties lack an interest in the outcome.  Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).  A case is ripe when the issues in the case 
are fit for judicial consideration, and there would be hardship against a party if the 
court did not hear the case.  Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1998).  
This concept carried over to disputes between the legislative and executive branches 
because there must be a true impasse between the two bodies for the dispute to be 
justiciable.  Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).  
The political question doctrine bars a claim if the issue is better suited for the 
executive or legislative branches of government.  See infra notes 171–182 and 
accompanying text (discussing the political question doctrine and enumerating the 
standards from the Baker test). 
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the claim.98  Standing addresses the question of whether a party is 
entitled to have a court decide the question that the party is bringing 
before that court.99  Standing’s role as judicial gatekeeper means that 
it is an important legal concept,100 but despite its importance—or 
maybe because of it—standing has not been strictly defined or 
limited by the Court.101  Instead, the Court has identified specific 
principles that it relies upon in determining standing, including:  
maintaining the appropriate balance of power between the judiciary 
and other branches of government, preserving judicial efficiency, and 
addressing only specific legal questions.102 
There are two different types of standing:  Article III standing and 
prudential standing.  Article III standing is based on the 
constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to  
“cases and controversies.”103  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,104 the 
Rehnquist Court established three elements required for Article III 
standing:  an injury,105 causation,106 and redressability.107 
The Supreme Court has primarily focused on the requirement that 
there be an actual injury when considering an Article III standing 
issue.108  Lujan established that an injury sufficient for standing is one 
that is “concrete and particularized,” as well as “actual or imminent,” 
                                                 
 98. See Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 214–15 (stating that a claim does not 
satisfy the Constitution’s case or controversy requirement if it does not meet the four 
justiciability standards). 
 99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 60. 
 100. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (arguing that standing  
“is perhaps the most important” of the doctrines that fundamentally limit judicial 
power). 
 101. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (stating that standing has not been consistently 
defined in past decisions, and there is no simple way to define the term). 
 102. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 61 (discussing the Court’s modern position 
on standing and the factors it considers when addressing challenges to standing). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 214 (noting 
that this phrase is “an indispensible restriction of the jurisdiction of the federal 
judiciary”). 
 104. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 105. See id. at 560 n.1 (establishing that the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way”). 
 106. See id. at 560 (defining causation as a “causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of”). 
 107. See id. at 561 (requiring that there be some likelihood of the possibility of 
redress for the complaining party). 
 108. See Arend & Lotrointe, supra note 97, at 216 (“While the second and third 
criteria are self-explanatory, the Supreme Court has spent a great deal of time 
elaborating on the first criterion:  the requirement of injury.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 57, at 62–63 (considering the elements of causation and redressability as a 
single entity addressed by the courts). 
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rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.”109  However, that definition 
has not resolved questions surrounding the plaintiff’s relationship to 
the injury and the scope of the injury itself.110  In addressing the 
personal nature of the injury, the Court has held that the plaintiff 
must show that he was adversely affected by the alleged action.111   
In considering what injuries are sufficient for standing, the Court 
established that the common law, the Constitution, and statutes all 
establish interests sufficient for a claim to proceed.112  The Court has 
not spoken definitively as to what other injuries are sufficient to 
establish standing.113 
There is limited jurisprudence on the requirements for satisfying 
the causation and redressability elements of standing.  In earlier 
decisions, the Court treated the two elements as part of one test.114  
However, the Court has since clarified its position and indicated that 
the two elements must be considered independently.115 
Along with Article III standing, the doctrine of prudential standing 
incorporates three additional factors that courts consider when 
determining whether a party can bring a suit.116  Specifically, the 
Court has recognized a general limitation on third-party standing, a 
prohibition against generalized grievances, and a requirement that 
the plaintiff be within the zone of interests protected by a statute.117  
These factors are self-imposed by the courts and can be overcome by 
                                                 
 109. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  The Court stated that an appropriate injury would 
require that the plaintiff show that a “legally protected interest” was at issue.  Id. 
 110. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 64 (“Two questions arise in implementing 
the injury requirement:  What does it mean to say that a plaintiff must personally 
suffer an injury; and what types of injuries are sufficient for standing?”). 
 111. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (rejecting the plaintiff’s 
claim on the grounds that an interest in the alleged problem was not sufficient to 
establish standing). 
 112. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 70–74 (discussing injuries sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional standing requirements, including injuries to common law, 
constitutional, and statutory rights, as well as other types of injuries, such as 
environmental harm or a shift in market conditions). 
 113. See id. at 73 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent does not develop a 
standard principle for determining which interests are sufficient to establish an 
injury). 
 114. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (holding that a plaintiff 
must establish causation or redressability to satisfy standing requirements). 
 115. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (arguing that inquiry into 
causation must be kept separate from the inquiry into redressability). 
 116. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 63 (discussing the distinction between 
prudential standing and constitutionally required standing). 
 117. See generally id. at 82–101 (detailing the general categories of, and limitations 
on, prudential standing). 
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legislation.118  Consistent with the doctrine of prudential standing, 
one of the powers Congress has is the ability to determine and 
express exactly whose interests are protected by a specific statute.119  
In the 2007 Massachusetts v. EPA120 decision, the Court indicated that 
where Congress creates a procedural right for a party to protect 
concrete interests, certain standing requirements are relaxed.121  
Specifically, the Court suggested that Congress can statutorily 
establish injuries that are sufficient to satisfy the constitutional 
standing requirements.122  The Court also recognized that states are 
unique and merit different considerations than private entities when 
addressing standing questions.123 
The implications of the doctrine of prudential standing have not 
been fully established.  Some legal scholars take the view that 
prudential standing gives legislators the power to control the scope of 
the cases the courts consider.124  Other commentators argue that 
since a plaintiff must satisfy the Article III standing requirements 
regardless of whether a prudential standing requirement is 
applicable, Congress’s power to control access to the courts is 
limited.125 
                                                 
 118. See Ryan McManus, Note, Sitting in Congress and Standing in Court:   
How Presidential Signing Statements Open the Door to Legislator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
739, 743 (2007) (stating that at least some of the prudential requirements, including 
the bar against a third party claim and the requirement that the claim be within the 
plaintiff’s “zone of interest,” are independent from the courts’ Article III powers, and 
thus can be overcome by statutory changes). 
 119. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1970) 
(indicating that under its authority to regulate prudential standing through 
legislation, Congress was enlarging the class of parties who could challenge 
administrative action). 
 120. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 121. See id. at 517–18 (finding that where Congress creates a procedural right, one 
“can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy”). 
 122. See id. at 516 (arguing that Congress has the authority to define injuries and 
establish causation). 
 123. See id. at 518 (providing that the limited sovereignty of states entitles them to 
unique standing considerations). 
 124. See, e.g., James Dumont, Beyond Standing:  Proposals for Congressional Response to 
Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675, 678 (1989) (arguing that under 
Article III, Congress has the power to expand the scope of judicial power to review a 
broader variety of cases and controversies).  But see Roberts, supra note 57, at 1226 
(stating that Article III limits congressional power such that Congress cannot expand 
the scope of the case or controversy requirement). 
 125. See, e.g., Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion:  Standing at the 
Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548, 1562–63 (1993) 
(acknowledging that Congress can establish a legally created injury but it must still 
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing). 
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Standing has an important role in maintaining the separation of 
powers between the branches of American government.  In the 1984 
Allen v. Wright126 decision, the Rehnquist Court explicitly stated that 
separation of powers considerations were integral in reviewing the 
causation element of standing.127  Justice Scalia has argued that the 
principle of standing clearly affects the separation of powers because 
it can be applied to exclude an entire issue from adjudication.128  
Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy hinges on applying 
standing as a tool to limit the judiciary’s interference with the other 
branches of government.129  Recently, the Roberts Court has made 
standing an important factor in a number of cases, indicating that for 
a claim to be successful, it must clearly satisfy all standing 
requirements.130 
Theoretically, standing for legislators claiming an institutional 
injury is no different than traditional standing.  In order for 
legislators to bring a claim in court, the claim must satisfy the Article 
III and prudential standing criteria stated above.131  In the relatively 
small number of cases addressing the issue, however, the courts have 
set a higher bar for legislators seeking access to the judicial system.132 
The Supreme Court first considered legislative standing to redress 
institutional injuries in 1939 in Coleman v. Miller.133  In Coleman, 
twenty-one Kansas state senators as well as a number of members of 
                                                 
 126. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 127. See id. at 761 (relying on the principle of separation of powers to reject a 
claim that an administrative agency’s policies failed to fulfill specific obligations). 
 128. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 892 (1983) (“[I]f all persons who 
could conceivably raise a particular issue are excluded, the issue is excluded as 
well.”). 
 129. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1220 (arguing that standing is vital to preserving 
the limited role of the courts); see also Jess Bravin, Barring the Door:  Court Under Roberts 
Limits Judicial Power, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at A1 (asserting that Roberts’s theory of 
“judicial self-restraint” was based on limiting access to the courts). 
 130. See Krista L. Dewitt, Note, The Revival of Standing as a Limitation to Litigation:  
Will Standing Cause More Cases to Fall?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 601, 602 (2008) 
(arguing that the Roberts Court has “refueled” the debate on whether a party 
satisfies the standing requirements). 
 131. See generally supra notes 104–125 and accompanying text (addressing both 
Article III and prudential standing requirements). 
 132. See generally infra notes 133–170 and accompanying text (discussing the 
leading cases in the field of legislative standing). 
 133. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).  This remains the only case where the Supreme Court 
has recognized legislative standing for institutional injuries.  See, e.g., David J. Weiner, 
Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 214 (2001) (describing 
Coleman as “the one previous instance in which the Supreme Court recognized an 
institutional injury as a predicate for a legislative suit”). 
  
750 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:731 
 
the state House of Representatives sued the Secretary of the Senate to 
block the endorsement of the Child Labor Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.134  The respondent challenged the legislators’ 
standing to bring such a claim on the grounds that the legislators did 
not have an adequate interest in the dispute.135  The Court held that 
because the legislators’ votes should have defeated the measure, the 
legislators had a “plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining 
the effectiveness of their votes.”136  The Supreme Court recognized 
that where a legislator’s vote was negated by outside action, the 
legislator could assert an injury sufficient for standing; thus, the 
nullification of the Kansas legislators’ votes was an injury sufficient to 
establish standing.137 
Following Coleman, the D.C. Circuit took the lead in addressing 
legislative standing, with the criteria evolving over three different 
tests.138  First, the D.C. Circuit determined that where judicial 
interpretation of executive action would “bear upon” the duties of 
the legislature, legislators had standing to sue.139  One year later, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the “bears upon” test and instead relied on vote 
nullification as the basis for legislative standing.140  In a later case, the 
D.C. Circuit expressly limited vote nullification as the basis for 
legislative standing to situations where the legislative process could 
not remedy the injury.141  Finally, the D.C. Circuit established the  
two-part equitable discretion test, under which a legislator had to 
                                                 
 134. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436 (challenging the Lieutenant Governor’s right to 
cast the deciding vote and arguing that the proposed Amendment “had lost its 
vitality” as a result of the Amendment’s rejection by twenty-six states and its failure to 
become ratified within a reasonable period of time). 
 135. Id. at 438. 
 136. See id. (stating that the legislators’ claims fell squarely within the statute 
providing for the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and that they could 
properly seek redress in the Supreme Court). 
 137. See id. (finding that if standing were denied the legislators’ votes would be 
“virtually held for naught” regardless of the fact that if their contentions were correct 
their votes would be sufficient to change the outcome of the resolution). 
 138. See McManus, supra note 118, at 749 (discussing the evolution of the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach to legislative standing). 
 139. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting members 
of the House of Representatives standing to sue members of the executive branch to 
block those executive branch members from engaging in acts of war without 
congressional approval). 
 140. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that  
“an individual legislator has standing to protect the effectiveness of his vote”). 
 141. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702–03 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (allowing 
standing where senators had no opportunity to challenge the executive’s termination 
of a treaty through the legislative process), rev’d on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) 
(dismissing the complaint as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine). 
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prove the traditional elements of standing as well as show that there 
were no other means to seek redress and that no other citizen could 
bring the claim.142 
Fifty-eight years after Coleman, the Supreme Court considered 
legislative standing once again, hearing Raines v. Byrd,143 a case 
specifically addressing the issue of vote nullification.144  Four senators 
and two representatives who had voted against the Line Item Veto Act 
in their respective chambers challenged the Act as unconstitutional.145  
The Act had passed in the Senate by a vote of 69-31 and in the House 
of Representatives by a vote of 232-177.146  The Court held that, for a 
number of reasons, the congressmen lacked standing to bring the 
suit because there was not a sufficient injury to their interests.147  
However, the majority concluded by noting that both chambers as a 
whole opposed the challenge brought by a subset of legislators in this 
case, that other parties may have standing to challenge the Line Item 
Veto Act, and that Congress could take future steps to repeal the 
legislation.148 
In light of Raines, the D.C. Circuit has addressed legislative 
standing twice, in Chenowith v. Clinton149 and Campbell v. Clinton.150   
In the 1999 Chenowith decision, legislators challenged President 
Clinton’s implementation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative 
on the grounds that the implementation denied them their 
constitutionally guaranteed right and responsibility to debate and 
vote on the various political issues stemming from the initiative.151  
                                                 
 142. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (1981) (relying on a 
fair application of the standing principles and a goal of not interfering with the 
legislative process as the basis of a two-part analysis of legislative standing cases). 
 143. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
 144. See id. at 824–26 (discussing the vote nullification theory and distinguishing 
Coleman by emphasizing the “vast difference between the level of vote nullification at 
issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional legislative power” alleged 
here). 
 145. See id. at 816 (challenging the Act as a violation of the bicameralism and 
presentment clauses of Article I). 
 146. Id. at 814. 
 147. See id. at 829 (distinguishing this case from Coleman because the injury 
asserted here was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed”). 
 148. See id. (regarding as important the fact that the legislator-plaintiffs were not 
“authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action”). 
 149. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 150. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 151. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 113 (explaining that President Clinton formally 
established the initiative by executive order and listing the various political issues 
arising from it, such as concerns involving interstate commerce, federal lands, the 
expenditure of federal monies, and implementation of environmental policies). 
  
752 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:731 
 
Despite that problem, the court rejected the legislators’ claim for 
standing based on the Raines standards.152 
The court recognized, however, that there may still be an avenue 
for legislative standing based on the theory of vote nullification.153  
Specifically, the court determined that an earlier decision, Kennedy v. 
Sampson,154 granting legislative standing to a senator who challenged 
the President’s pocket veto of legislation that both Houses of 
Congress had passed may still be good law after Raines.155  Addressing 
Kennedy, the court reasoned that a president’s action that prevents a 
bill from becoming law could constitute vote nullification sufficient 
to satisfy the Raines requirements.156 
The D.C. Circuit took a much more in-depth look at the legislative 
standing issue in Campbell.  That 2000 decision arose from a challenge 
to President Clinton’s authorization of the U.S.’s participation in 
international airstrikes against Yugoslavia.157  The legislators argued 
that the President’s actions were illegal both constitutionally and 
statutorily.158  The court posited that the Supreme Court failed to 
adequately define vote nullification in Campbell and Raines.159  Despite 
the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the 
legislators’ claim based on lack of standing.160  Judge Silberman, 
writing for the majority, relied heavily on the Raines decision to 
determine that where congressmen have a legislative remedy for an 
alleged injury, they will not have standing to assert a claim in court.161 
                                                 
 152. See id. at 115 (stating that the legislators’ claim for standing was 
indistinguishable from the injury asserted in Raines and thus was too “widely 
dispersed” and “abstract” to survive). 
 153. See id. at 116–17 (suggesting that Raines may not undermine some of the 
Court’s earlier decisions on legislative standing based on vote nullification). 
 154. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 155. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 116 (“Even under this narrow interpretation  
[of vote nullification by the Raines Court], one could argue that the plaintiff in 
Kennedy had standing.”). 
 156. See id. at 117 (asserting that a pocket veto could create a plausible argument 
that executive action completely nullified legislators’ votes). 
 157. See 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that the NATO airstrikes against 
Yugoslavia were in response to Yugoslavia’s occupation of Kosovo). 
 158. See id. (alleging that “the President’s use of American forces against 
Yugoslavia was unlawful under both the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and 
the War Powers Resolution”). 
 159. See id. at 22 (“It is, to be sure, not readily apparent what the Supreme Court 
meant by [the word ‘nullified’].”). 
 160. See id. at 23–24 (stating that the legislators may not use the federal courts to 
challenge the President’s war-making powers). 
 161. See id. at 23 (finding that legislators could not assert a vote nullification claim 
because they had the legislative power to defeat President Clinton’s order through a 
number of possible avenues, including passing a law forbidding the use of U.S. forces 
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Judge Randolph, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the 
legislators’ claim would fail the Raines analysis but under different 
reasoning than Judge Silberman.162  Instead, Judge Randolph argued 
that since the executive did nothing to implement the legislative 
actions Congress had defeated, there was no vote nullification.163  
Specifically, President Clinton took no military action that would 
require congressional approval under the Constitution; thus, he 
could not have nullified the legislators’ successful votes against the 
declaration of war.164  Also, by refusing to adhere to Congress’s 
rejection of an authorizing resolution, President Clinton was not 
nullifying the legislators’ votes on that resolution.165  Instead, 
according to Judge Randolph, President Clinton was not ignoring the 
legislators’ vote; he was simply disregarding the War Powers 
Resolution itself and the votes of the earlier Congress that had 
enacted it.166  Thus, Judge Randolph concluded that a complaint of 
that nature from the legislators was not a valid reason for granting 
legislative standing based on vote nullification.167 
Other lower courts have struggled to establish a clear standard for 
what injuries are sufficient to make out a successful vote nullification 
claim following Raines, which has led to a variety of holdings in 
different circuits.  For example, the Sixth Circuit has taken a literal 
                                                 
in the campaign, exercising the appropriations power to cut off funding, or 
ultimately, through impeachment). 
 162. See id. at 28, 32 (Randolph, J., concurring) (reasoning that because Congress 
will always have the ability to take responsive legislative action in the future, an 
argument that rejects legislative standing based on the legislators’ ability to take 
future legislative action will effectively do away with the legislative standing doctrine, 
a result that was not clearly intended by the Supreme Court in Raines). 
 163. See id. at 31 (rejecting the legislative standing claim because “in terms of 
Raines[,] . . . plaintiffs had the votes ‘sufficient to defeat’ ‘a specific legislative action’ 
. . . but it is not true . . . that this ‘legislative action’ nevertheless went ‘into effect’”). 
 164. See id. (stating that “[t]he President has nothing to veto” and that “[he] may 
have acted as if he had Congress’s approval, or he may have acted as if he did not 
need it”). 
 165. See id. (explaining the automatic operation of the War Powers Resolution:  
unless both chambers act to approve the military action, the troops must withdraw 
after sixty days).  The War Powers Resolution requires the President to withdraw 
troops within sixty days of the commencement of military action unless a majority of 
both chambers declares war or approves a continuation of the military action.   
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006). 
 166. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (“[The legislators’] 
real complaint . . . is that [the President] ignored the War Powers Resolution . . . .”). 
 167. See id. (recognizing that separation of powers concerns arise by allowing 
legislative standing on the basis asserted by the plaintiff-legislators). 
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approach to vote nullification.168  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has 
granted standing based on vote nullification to a party that did not 
have a vote in the legislature.169 
Any claim of legislative standing faces an added hurdle because the 
plaintiff-legislator must also overcome the barriers imposed by the 
political question doctrine.  While the Raines Court did not 
specifically discuss the political question doctrine, part of the reason 
the Court rejected standing for the legislators was because of the 
political nature of their claim.170 
The political question doctrine arose out of Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison.171  The doctrine bars courts from 
encroaching on an unresolved political dispute within the other 
branches of government by requiring that courts address an actual 
legal issue.172  The impetus for the doctrine was to provide an 
                                                 
 168. See Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2001) (adopting Coleman’s 
proposition that for legislators to have standing, they must possess enough votes to 
have reversed the actual outcome of the legislation at issue). 
 169. See Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 545–46 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending 
legislative standing to the Governor of Guam based on vote nullification by the 
Guam Supreme Court because, under the operation of a Guam statute, the 
Governor’s inaction (i.e., neither signing nor vetoing the bill) should have allowed 
the bill to pass, but a Guam Supreme Court ruling inverted the statute and required 
the Governor to take action or otherwise the legislation would be vetoed by his 
inaction). 
 170. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997) (describing the legislators’ claim 
as a loss of legislative power instead of another more concrete injury). 
 171. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (stating that 
certain political powers granted to the executive are “only politically examinable”). 
 172. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the original factors 
that would render an issue nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, 
including a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political 
department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
the issue, the impossibility of deciding the issue without a policy determination, the 
inability of a court to decide the issue without eroding the respect due the other 
branches of government, an unusual need for adherence to a political decision 
already made, and the potential for embarrassment as a result of differing 
conclusions by each department).  Some scholars have argued that there is no such 
doctrine and that courts are simply abiding by the constitutional delegation and 
separation of powers doctrines.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” 
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 601 (1976) (“The cases which are supposed to have 
established the political question doctrine required no such extra-ordinary 
abstention from judicial review; they called only for the ordinary respect by the 
courts for the political domain.”).  However, the standards enumerated in Baker are 
good law, have been referenced repeatedly, and were found determinative by the 
Court as recently as 1993.  See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226, 238 (1993) 
(citing Baker in support of its rejection of a federal judge’s challenge to his 
impeachment as a nonjusticiable political question). 
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additional tool for preserving the separation of powers and to prevent 
friction between the branches.173 
The Court in Baker v. Carr174 enumerated six characteristics relevant 
to determining whether an issue was a nonjusticiable political 
question.175  The Court later determined that the Baker Court 
probably believed that not all of the factors carry equal weight, 
reasoning that the factors at the beginning of the list are probably 
more important and more certain than those towards the end.176   
In the end, judges assessing legislative standing must also consider 
whether the issue is one better suited for resolution in a political 
branch of government (i.e., the executive or legislative branch).177 
The first Baker factor establishes that if the Constitution textually 
commits an issue to a political department, the issue is 
nonjusticiable.178  Second, if there are no judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving the issue, it cannot be considered 
by the judiciary.179  Third, an issue is a nonjusticiable political 
question if rendering a decision requires a policy determination from 
a political branch.180  Courts have stated that the final three factors in 
the political question doctrine test as laid out in Baker are ambiguous 
and unreliable.181  Those three, respectively, render a decision 
nonjusticiable if resolving the issue would lead to undue disrespect to 
one of the political branches, require unusual adherence to a prior 
political decision, or create embarrassment due to multiple 
statements on the issue from the different branches.182 
Aside from suing the executive as individual legislators, Congress 
has additional tools through which members can challenge executive 
action or inaction.  For example, Congress can use legislative tools, 
                                                 
 173. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210–11 (calling the doctrine “primarily a function of the 
separation of powers” because it requires a reviewing court to examine the 
Constitution to determine to which branch of government the matter was assigned). 
 174. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 175. See id. at 217; see also supra note 172 (listing the six Baker political question 
factors). 
 176. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (“These tests are probably 
listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.”). 
 177. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (stating that the “finality [of] the actions of the 
political departments” is a dominant consideration when determining whether an 
issue is a nonjusticiable political question). 
 178. Id. at 217. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that 
the final three Baker elements are relevant in only the most extreme situations). 
 182. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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such as its appropriations power and investigative power, to punish 
the executive for failing to enforce duly passed legislation.183  
Alternatively, Congress can sue as a single entity in its institutional 
capacity.184  Finally, Congress could pass legislation granting itself 
standing when the executive interprets legislation differently from 
how Congress wrote it or intended it.185 
II. MEDELLÍN GIVES RISE TO A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO THAT COULD 
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO AN EFFECTIVE CLAIM FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING 
While there has not yet been a situation that gives rise to a claim 
that the executive is exceeding his power by refusing to enforce terms 
of a treaty, the possibility is foreseeable in light of the Medellín 
holding.  For such a situation to arise, three basic conditions would 
have to be met.  First, there must be some dispute as to whether a 
treaty term is self-executing.186  Second, the Senate must assert that it 
intended the treaty term to be self-executing when it ratified the 
treaty.187  Finally, the executive must refuse to enforce the provision 
that the legislative branch claims he must enforce.188 
A dispute over whether a treaty term is self-executing could arise in 
a variety of situations, easily satisfying the first condition.  The 
Supreme Court raised this question in Medellín when it refused to 
review whether terms within the VCCR were self-executing.189  In light 
of that position, there is no definitive answer to questions 
                                                 
 183. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Congress has formidable weapons at its disposal—the 
power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond those available in the 
Third Branch.”). 
 184. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,  
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 1998) (challenging in its institutional capacity a 
Commerce Department and Census Bureau plan to use statistical sampling in the 
2000 census as inconsistent with the Constitution and the Census Act). 
 185. See, e.g., Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong.  
§§ 3, 5 (2006) (proposing the establishment of standing for members of Congress to 
challenge the legality of any presidential signing statement, which is a statement the 
President drafts about a bill in conjunction with signing the bill into law). 
 186. See supra Part I.A and Part I.C (discussing self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties generally and as analyzed in Medellín). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra notes 133–170 (discussing various cases in which legislators based 
their argument for standing in federal court on the theory of vote nullification). 
 189. 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008). 
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surrounding the domestic impact of the VCCR as a self-executing or 
non-self-executing treaty.190 
Further, there is rarely language in a treaty that explicitly indicates 
that the treaty term is self-executing.191  For example, in Medellín, the 
treaty term in question said nothing as to whether additional 
legislation was necessary to enact ICJ judgments.192  As Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissent, similar language in other treaties had been 
deemed sufficient to establish the self-executing nature of the treaty 
term.193  Additionally, in two Supreme Court cases decided a few years 
apart, the Court read the same treaty term as non-self-executing in 
the first case but as self-executing in the second.194  These examples 
suggest that a dispute over whether a treaty term is self-executing is 
quite possible. 
To satisfy the second condition, the Senate must intend that the 
treaty term be self-executing at the time of ratification.195  The 
                                                 
 190. Even though the Court did not specifically address the issue in Medellín, most 
courts and commentators agree that the VCCR is a self-executing treaty.  See, e.g., 
Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007) (“There is no 
question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing.”); Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, 
Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 306 n.15 (2008) (presenting a variety of sources supporting 
the claim that the VCCR is a self-executing treaty).  However, some scholars have 
identified an ongoing debate over whether the treaty is self-executing or non-self-
executing.  See, e.g., Howard S. Schiffman, The LaGrand Decision:  The Evolving Legal 
Landscape of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases,  
42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2002) (arguing that enacting state and federal 
legislation implementing the VCCR requirements would nullify any remaining 
argument over whether the VCCR was self-executing or non-self-executing).  Finally, 
at least one commentator argues that the Medellín decision itself casts a new question 
as to whether the VCCR is self-executing.  See David S. Corbett, Comment, From 
Breard to Medellin II:  The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in Perspective,  
5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 808, 820 (2008) (stating that the Medellín holding was based on 
the Court’s determination that the VCCR is a non-self-executing treaty). 
 191. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaty 
provisions the Court had previously ruled self-executing lacked clear language 
indicating them as such). 
 192. See id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (relying on the “undertakes to comply” 
language in the treaty to determine that there was a need for implementing 
legislation before an ICJ decision could become binding on state courts). 
 193. See id. at 1383–84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a commerce and navigation 
treaty between the United States and Denmark to illustrate that language that does 
not direct the United States to act domestically can still lead to a determination that 
a treaty is self-executing). 
 194. Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) 253, 315 (1829) (determining that 
a specific term in the Adams-Onís Treaty required implementing legislation before it 
was binding on domestic courts), with United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
51, 88–89 (1833) (finding that the same term in the Adams-Onís Treaty was self-
executing based on a reading of the Spanish-language version of the treaty). 
 195. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1349. 
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Medellín Court indicated that the intent of the President and Senate 
when they implemented the treaty controlled the determination of 
whether the treaty term was self-executing.196  Such intent could be 
based on the treaty negotiators’ understanding at the time that the 
treaty was signed or the interpretation of the body charged with 
interpreting the treaty.197  Alternatively, legislators could indicate 
their intent through a variety of legislative documents arising out of 
the ratification process.198  Finally, intent could be derived from the 
way the other signatories to the agreement behave after they sign the 
treaty.199 
The third condition, which arises from the Medellín holding, 
specifies that the President must refuse to enforce a treaty term that 
the Senate intended to be self-executing.200  Based on a presumption 
of non-self-execution,201 the executive would be free to assert that the 
treaty term was not self-executing.202  Courts generally defer to the 
                                                 
 196. See id. at 1366–67 (relying on various indicia of the intent of the President 
and the Senate in determining that the relevant treaty terms were 
non-self-executing); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) (“[T]he intention of the United States 
determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States . . . .”). 
 197. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1361 n.9 (considering the ICJ’s interpretation and 
understanding of the relevant treaty terms in determining whether the terms were 
self-executing); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) 
(recognizing that the negotiating and drafting history of a treaty are both relevant to 
treaty interpretation). 
 198. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359–60 (examining testimony from hearings 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the treaty interpretation process). 
 199. See Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226 (establishing that the post-ratification 
understanding of the signatories to a treaty is an important element in treaty 
interpretation); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation Of Powers as a Safeguard 
of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1619 (2008) (suggesting that since some 
countries require all treaties to be implemented through domestic legislation,  
U.S. courts will rarely be able to conclude that a multinational treaty is self-executing 
because a determination of self-execution relies on the mutual intent and actions of 
all parties to a treaty). 
 200. Cf. R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Tried to Soften Treaty on Detainees, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 
2009, at A3 (discussing the Bush administration’s three-year effort to modify the 
language in a treaty to make the treaty more favorable in light of the U.S. enemy 
combatant policy).  Although there is no direct example of such executive action, 
signing statements offer a strong parallel because it is another example of the 
executive acting contrary to legislative intent.  See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges 
Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at 
A1 (arguing that the reason for President Bush’s use of signing statements was to 
undermine legislative intent and to indicate that his interpretation of the legislation 
presented to him was different from Congress’s). 
 201. See infra Part III (discussing the development of a presumption of 
non-self-execution). 
 202. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
34, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (per curiam) (asserting 
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executive when it comes to treaty interpretation.203  Whether merited 
or not, such deference could encourage the executive to act without 
regard to the Senate’s post-ratification position on the treaty.204 
There are numerous examples of situations where the executive 
refuses to enforce an act duly passed by the legislature and signed by 
the President.205  In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration broadly 
expanded the constitutionally accepted device of impoundment.206  
Through impoundment, the Nixon administration rejected 
congressional add-ons to the executive budget in numerous areas 
even though the budget as approved by Congress was the actual 
public law.207  The Nixon administration effectively ignored duly 
enacted legislation—the budget—in favor of the President’s own 
unenacted budget recommendations.208  More recently, President 
Bush’s use of signing statements could arguably be characterized as 
an overt extension of executive power despite legislative limitations.209  
Finally, with the dominant role of administrative agencies, it is not 
uncommon to see the executive interpret language in a manner 
                                                 
that the “undertakes to comply” language in the United Nations Charter foresaw the 
need for action from the political branches of the government prior to making the 
ICJ decision domestically enforceable and thus the relevant treaty terms were not 
self-executing). 
 203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 111 cmt. h (1987) (granting the President the authority to make the initial 
determination as to whether a term is self-executing after the ratification of a treaty). 
 204. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 U.S. 1346, 1355 (2008) (referring to President 
Bush’s memorandum that completely ignored legislative intent and stated that it was 
within the authority of the executive to determine that state courts must give effect to 
the ICJ decision regarding Medellín and the fifty-one other foreign nationals 
challenging the state judicial action). 
 205. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral 
Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 132 (1999) (arguing that the power of the executive 
to operate unilaterally defines the modern presidency). 
 206. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 204 (4th ed. 1997) (arguing that Nixon’s use of impoundment “set a 
precedent in terms of magnitude, severity, and belligerence”). 
 207. See id. at 204–05 (identifying the administration’s position that legislative 
additions to the budget were irresponsible or meritless). 
 208. See id. at 205 (“What deserved implementation was not a President’s budget 
but a public law.”). 
 209. Compare Savage, supra note 200, at A1 (“President Bush has quietly claimed 
the authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office . . . .”),  
with Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 312 (2006) (arguing that while quantitatively high, 
President Bush’s signing statements were substantively similar to those used by his 
predecessors). 
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substantially different from the interpretation the legislature 
intended.210 
Consider the following hypothetical presenting a situation that 
could lead to a basis for a claim of vote nullification.  The President 
enters into a treaty with another industrialized country, with the 
United States understanding the treaty terms to be self-executing.211  
However, there is no direct language in the treaty that explicitly 
makes it self-executing.212  The treaty requires the countries’ 
administrative agencies to penalize factory owners if carbon emissions 
exceed a certain level.213  The Senate ratifies the treaty with the 
understanding that the terms are self-executing.214  During the 
signing president’s term, no factories exceed the mandated limit, and 
no regulatory action is necessary.  During the subsequent presidency, 
factories begin to exceed the limit but the executive branch refuses to 
take the action required by the treaty, and the President argues that 
he is not obligated to take such action because the treaty is non-self-
executing.215 
In the above scenario, private citizens would probably not have 
standing to sue because they would not satisfy the injury-in-fact 
                                                 
 210. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d. 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (challenging the Census Bureau’s interpretation of 
the Census Act); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–94 (1978) 
(enjoining a federal entity from completing a dam where the completion of the dam 
would likely cause the extinction of an animal protected by the Endangered Species 
Act because the executive could only execute the laws as passed by the legislature). 
 211. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-24, at 18 (2000) [hereinafter MLAT Ratification] 
(“For the United States, the Treaty is intended to be self-executing; no new or 
additional legislation will be needed to carry out the obligations undertaken.”);  
cf. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, U.S.-Cyprus, Dec. 20, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,078 
[hereinafter MLAT] (agreeing to provide mutual assistance in the investigation, 
prosecution, and prevention of crimes). 
 212. See, e.g., MLAT, supra note 211 (making no reference to the legal 
effectiveness of the treaty in the United States). 
 213. Cf. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 3, May 22, 
2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119, 218 (requiring member states to promulgate regulations to 
restrict the production of certain industrial chemicals). 
 214. Cf. MLAT Ratification, supra note 211, at 18 (“For the United States, the 
Treaty is intended to be self-executing; no new or additional legislation will be 
needed to carry out the obligations undertaken.”). 
 215. This sort of reversal of position with regard to international obligations when 
a new administration takes office is distinctly possible.  See, e.g., Margaret Maffai, 
Comment, Accountability for Private Military and Security Company Employees that Engage 
in Sex Trafficking and Related Abuses While Under Contract with the United States Overseas, 
26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1095, 1122–23 (2009) (discussing the Bush administration’s 
renunciation of all obligations stemming from the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in May of 2002 after the Clinton administration had signed the 
agreement in December of 2000). 
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requirement.216  It is unlikely that Congress would be able to pass 
implementing legislation for the treaty because that would require 
the vote of both chambers and the President’s signature, as long as 
less than two-thirds of congress approves, after the executive has 
already indicated his disapproval of the requirements by refusing to 
enforce them.217  Therefore, the only remaining challenge to the 
executive’s unilateral decision that the treaty term was non-self-
executing would be for members of the Senate who intended the 
treaty term to be self-executing when they voted for ratification to sue 
alleging vote nullification. 
III. MEDELLÍN CREATES A PRESUMPTION OF NON-SELF-EXECUTION 
THAT SHIFTS TREATY ENFORCEMENT POWER IN FAVOR OF THE 
EXECUTIVE 
While the immediate effect of Medellín may have been to dampen 
executive power in the instant case, the long-term effect was just the 
opposite.  By promoting a presumption that treaty terms are non-self-
executing, the Court actually increased executive power.218  Such a 
presumption gives the executive virtually unchecked power because 
as the above hypothetical suggests, the President can rely on that 
presumption to unilaterally refuse to enforce treaty terms 
domestically.219  This new executive power is enhanced even further 
by the limited ability of legislators to assert claims for institutional 
injuries in American courts.220 
                                                 
 216. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (establishing that 
to satisfy standing requirements, an injury must be actual or imminent instead of 
conjectural or hypothetical); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541 (2007) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that global warming is too generalized of an 
injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement established in Lujan). 
 217. See Moe & Howell, supra note 205, at 143–46 (concluding that because 
Congress is made up of multiple members representing distinct constituencies, the 
President can unilaterally impede legislative efforts to change the status quo through 
the use of the veto power). 
 218. Compare Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 103, 153–54 (2008) (stating that in light of Medellín, U.S. treaties are presumed 
to be non-self-executing), with Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1373 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the Court was making its decision “[a]bsent a 
presumption one way or the other”), and Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and 
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540–41 (2008) (rejecting arguments 
that there is a presumption against self-execution and suggesting that there is no 
presumption at all). 
 219. See supra Part II. 
 220. See supra notes 133–170 and accompanying text (discussing the higher 
burden for legislative standing than traditional standing). 
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Prior to Medellín, legal scholars generally recognized a presumption 
in favor of self-execution.221  In Medellín, the Court clearly rejected 
that view by finding that a treaty term does not constitute domestic 
law if it does not either convey an intent that it be self-executing, or 
unless Congress has enacted implementing legislation.222  The Court 
went so far as to implicitly disavow the portion of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States supporting a 
presumption of self-execution.223 
The Court went beyond simply rejecting the presumption favoring 
self-execution; the Court implicitly promoted a presumption that 
treaties are non-self-executing.  The first indication that Medellín 
creates a presumption of non-self-execution was the Court’s reliance 
on the 1884 Head Money Cases.224  Those cases supported the view that 
domestic treaty enforcement was reliant on the honor of the 
governments that were party to the treaty.225  In the same paragraph 
of Medellín, the Court cited a distinction in The Federalist Papers 
between laws and treaties, endorsing the view that treaty enforcement 
is dependent on the good faith of the parties.226  A recognition that 
domestic treaty enforcement was based on honor, or the good faith 
of the parties, instead of the laws of the land in the respective 
countries party to a treaty suggests a view that treaties do not 
inherently make domestic law.227 
Another indication of the majority’s transition towards a 
presumption of non-self-execution was the strong endorsement of a 
                                                 
 221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 111 reporter’s note 5 (1987) (“[I]f the Executive Branch has not requested 
implementing legislation and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a 
strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-executing by the 
political branches . . . .”). 
 222. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens argued that there was no presumption favoring self-execution or non-
self-execution.  Id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 223. See Bradley, supra note 218, at 540 (recognizing that by clearly rejecting a 
strong presumption for self-execution, the Court rejected the Restatement’s 
endorsement of a low threshold for a treaty to be deemed self-executing). 
 224. 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 225. Id. at 598. 
 226. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 227. Many scholars view this approach as inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause, 
which places treaties on equal footing with legislation and regards both as the 
supreme law of the land.  See, e.g., Carlos M. Vasquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:   
The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 600 
(2008) (arguing that “[t]he concept of a non-self-executing treaty fits uneasily with 
the Supremacy Clause”). 
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text-centered approach to treaty interpretation.228  While the Court 
acknowledged that it could look at other indicia of intent, such as the 
negotiation and drafting history or the understanding of the parties 
after the treaty was implemented, it was clear that the text was the 
principal basis for treaty interpretation.229  In considering the 
Optional Protocol, the majority adhered to a textualist approach, 
disfavoring factors other than the treaty’s text and rejecting the 
dissent’s multifactor analysis.230  The Court’s narrow focus on the 
“undertakes to comply” language in the U.N. Charter and its quick 
determination that the phrase did not make the treaty obligation self-
executing suggest that unless the text of a treaty expressly makes a 
term self-executing, the term will be interpreted otherwise.231 
However, as is often the case in statutory interpretation, the “plain 
meaning” of the Optional Protocol was not as plain as the majority 
suggested.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer showed that the “undertakes 
to comply” language could easily be interpreted to create an 
obligation that the treaty be executed without enacting legislation.232  
At the very least, the Optional Protocol could be considered 
ambiguous in whether it indicated the drafters’ intent regarding self-
execution.233  The majority coming down on the side of non-self-
                                                 
 228. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“The interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with 
its text.”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 1362 (arguing that the dissent’s approach would lead to “the open-
ended rough-and-tumble of factors” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 231. See id. at 1358 (finding that the phrase was not an acknowledgement of its 
legal effect in American courts).  The Court suggested that the words “shall” or 
“must” might have satisfied the required intent necessary to make the obligation 
under the U.N. Charter self-executing.  Id. 
 232. See id. at 1384 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (using a dictionary definition of 
“undertake” to show that it could be interpreted to require execution).  Justice 
Breyer argued that the majority created clear-statement presumptions that many 
treaties that had already been deemed self-executing would not satisfy.  Id. at 1380.  
Breyer recommended a context-specific test to determine whether a treaty provision 
is self-executing.  Id. at 1382.  Along with his dictionary definition of “undertake,” 
Breyer’s analysis of the relevant treaties included a consideration of the language in 
the Spanish version of the U.N. Charter, which could be translated to say “become 
liable to execute.”  Id. at 1384 (internal citations omitted). 
 233. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J. concurring) (recognizing that the U.N. Charter 
“does not contain the kind of unambiguous language foreclosing self-execution that 
is found in other treaties”).  According to Justice Stevens, language that creates an 
obligation to enact legislation would more clearly reflect the drafters’ intent.  Id. 
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execution in light of the ambiguous language further endorses the 
view that all treaties are non-self-executing until proven otherwise.234 
The final sign that the majority favored a presumption of non-self-
execution was the high threshold the Court determined drafters must 
meet to show that their intent was to create a self-executing treaty.235  
As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, few, if any, treaty 
provisions that the Court had designated as self-executing in earlier 
decisions would satisfy the majority’s text-centered approach.236   
The only way Jose Medellín could have satisfied the Court’s test 
would have been to identify textual language clearly showing that the 
parties to the treaty intended it to be self-executing, thereby 
indicating the Court majority’s support for a presumption of non-self-
execution in Medellín.237 
Commentators have argued that the Court’s decision seemed to 
support Congress’s role in determining the enforceability of 
treaties.238  However, the decision only limited the President’s 
authority to domestically enforce non-self-executing treaty terms; it 
did not limit the President’s role in deciding whether a treaty was self-
executing or not.239  In fact, by creating a presumption of non-self-
execution, the Court made it possible for the executive to assert 
substantial power over the treaty enforcement process.240 
                                                 
 234. See Dorf, supra note 218, at 154 n.147 (basing the argument that Medellín 
creates a presumption of non-self-execution on the fact that implementing language 
is absolutely necessary for a treaty to be self-executing). 
 235. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that the majority 
opinion cites no case that would satisfy the text-centered approach and that the 
concurring opinion only supports the argument that few treaties have language 
clearly indicating an intent to be self-executing). 
 236. See id. at 1392–93 (listing cases as examples of the Court deciding that a treaty 
term was self-executing). 
 237. See id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (suggesting that if the “undertakes to 
comply” language contained “must” or “shall” the relevant provision of the U.N. 
Charter obligation would have been self-executing). 
 238. See Ilya Shapiro, Medellín v. Texas and the Ultimate Law School Exam, 2008 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 79 (arguing that the Court determined that if a treaty was not 
self-executing that “signals that Congress has reserved the decision to craft enabling 
legislation”); Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black:  The Formalization of Jackson’s 
Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellín, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2009) 
(providing that Medellín relied on the Youngstown scheme to determine that because 
the executive and the legislature disagreed on the enforceability of the ICJ decision, 
Congress’s position was favored). 
 239. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (“The President has an array of political and 
diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally 
converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.”). 
 240. See supra Part II (providing an example of an executive’s abuse of the 
presumption of non-self-execution). 
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IV. THE INCREASE IN EXECUTIVE POWER CREATED BY MEDELLÍN 
REQUIRES A MEANS—PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF LEGISLATIVE 
STANDING—TO CHECK THE EXECUTIVE 
How can Congress check such an assertion of power by the 
executive?  One possibility is that members of Congress could claim 
that such an act constitutes vote nullification because Congress’s vote 
to implement a treaty provision is being superseded by the 
President’s refusal to enforce that provision.  However, the Court’s 
limited jurisprudence on the issue, combined with the separation of 
powers concerns that the judiciary raises when considering a dispute 
between the legislature and the executive, would make such a claim 
challenging to assert.241 
Applying the facts from the hypothetical in Part II, if the 
executive’s interpretation of a treaty term is inconsistent with the 
Senate’s action on the treaty, the legislators would have standing to 
sue in their institutional capacity.  This Part first shows that the 
hypothetical senators’ claim could meet the traditional standing 
requirements that all plaintiffs must satisfy when they bring a claim.  
Next, Section B addresses legislative standing and proves that the 
senators have suffered the concrete injury of vote nullification.  
Having survived the threshold standing questions, Section C posits 
that the senators’ claim can survive consideration under the political 
question doctrine.  Finally, this Part considers the alternate courses of 
action available to legislators if they are denied access to the courts. 
A. Legislators Challenging Executive Action Following Medellín Can 
Satisfy the Traditional Elements of Both Article III and Prudential Standing 
Prior to a court’s consideration of the merits of the issue presented 
in the hypothetical, the legislator-plaintiffs would have to satisfy 
standing requirements.  As discussed above, legislators would have to 
prove that there was an actual injury caused by the opposing party 
that a judicial decision could remedy.242   
Legislators would satisfy the general injury requirements set forth 
by traditional standing jurisprudence.  Lujan requires a plaintiff to 
claim that a legally protected interest is at issue.243  Based on the 
                                                 
 241. See supra Part I.D. 
 242. See supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text. 
 243. See id.  Most legally protected interests fall into one of three categories:  an 
injury to common law rights, an injury to constitutional rights, or an injury to 
statutory rights.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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hypothetical, the injury to the legislators should satisfy those 
requirements because it is an injury to a constitutional right.244  
Specifically, the Constitution guarantees the Senate’s role in 
providing advice on and consenting to the implementation of a 
treaty.245  By ignoring the Senate’s intent in his enforcement of the 
treaty, the executive in the hypothetical is violating the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of the Senate to consent to the 
United States’s participation in a treaty. 
Within basic standing jurisprudence, showing that there is some 
possible injury is only the first step in satisfying the injury 
requirement.  The plaintiff must also assert an injury that is concrete 
and particularized, as well as actual or imminent, to gain standing.246  
The executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty term in the hypothetical 
is a concrete and particularized injury because the executive’s action 
harms the legislators individually by undermining their constitutional 
authority.247  In the hypothetical, the injury satisfies the actual or 
imminent requirement because the executive has already refused to 
enforce the treaty term.248 
As discussed below—in Section B of this Part—the hypothetical 
raises unique injury issues because the plaintiffs would be bringing 
the claim as legislators injured in their institutional capacity.  
However, the legislators would be able to satisfy the injury element of 
a traditional standing consideration. 
Causation is the second element of an Article III standing test.   
To satisfy causation, the plaintiff must show that there was a causal 
relationship between the act complained of and the injury.249   
The hypothetical legislators could prove causation because the injury 
                                                 
 244. Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987) (acknowledging a sufficient 
injury where the appellee claimed that the use of the term “political propaganda” 
abridged his First Amendment right to free speech).  The injury was sufficient 
because the appellee claimed that the use of the term threatened to “cause him 
cognizable injury.”  Id.  Specifically, the application of the term would harm his 
reputation and damage his opportunity to get re-elected to political office.  Id. 
 245. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 246. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 247. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (holding that for an injury to 
satisfy standing requirements, the plaintiff must allege specific facts “demonstrating 
that the challenged practices harm him”).  The Lujan Court defined the 
“particularized” element as requiring the injury to individually and personally affect 
the plaintiff.  504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
 248. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (indicating that a 
plaintiff must show that the injury has occurred or that he is in immediate danger of 
sustaining the injury). 
 249. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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complained of—vote nullification—resulted from decisions and 
actions of the executive, the opposing party in any action resulting 
from the hypothetical.250 
The final element of the Article III standing requirements is 
redressability.  Specifically, a positive decision from the court must be 
likely to ameliorate the plaintiff’s alleged injury.251  In the 
hypothetical, the positive outcome would be a holding that the treaty 
was self-executing and that the executive must therefore enforce its 
terms—specifically through an injunction ordering performance.252  
That outcome would satisfy the redressability requirement because it 
would redress the alleged injury, vote nullification.253  The principal 
concern leading to the redressability requirement is the judiciary’s 
aim of avoiding advisory opinions.254  Considering a dispute over 
treaty interpretation is not an advisory opinion; it instead resolves an 
actual dispute in favor of one branch.255 
No prudential standing concerns arise from the senators’ suit in 
the hypothetical.  The limit on third-party standing is not a problem 
because the senators are asserting their own rights or interests, 
instead of relying on the rights of others.256  The senators are not 
raising a generalized grievance because the injury is specific to them, 
and not something related to their status as citizens suing the 
government.257  Finally, the zone of interests requirement is not 
                                                 
 250. Cf. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 509 (recognizing a lack of causation where the injury 
complained of resulted from decisions made by an entity that was not involved in the 
case). 
 251. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (establishing that redress for the complaining party 
must be at least likely to satisfy standing requirements). 
 252. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 142 (1991) 
(stating that courts commonly grant specific relief by ordering governmental actors 
to comply with a law); cf. Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident:  Intellectual Property Under 
NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 261, 271 (1997) (“To remedy the consequences of breach of treaty . . . 
specific performance is theoretically available under public international law . . . .”). 
 253. Cf. Sprint Commc’n Co. v. APCC Servs., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2008) 
(holding that assignees could satisfy the redressability element of standing even if 
they immediately transferred any award they received to the assignor). 
 254. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 78 (noting the position of defenders of the 
redressability requirement). 
 255. See id. at 54–55 (recognizing that the key elements that make a case 
justiciable, instead of an advisory opinion, are a dispute between adverse parties and 
the likelihood of some change or effect if the outcome favors the plaintiff). 
 256. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (stating that a party cannot base 
his claim on the legal rights or interests of a third party). 
 257. See id. (finding that where a harm is equally shared by a large class of citizens, 
that harm is generally not sufficient for standing). 
  
768 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:731 
 
applicable because the senators’ right is a constitutional one, not one 
established by legislation.258 
B. Medellín Creates a Situation Where Legislators Can Satisfy the More 
Stringent Requirements Necessary to Establish Legislative Standing 
While satisfying the standing requirements may appear 
straightforward, the courts’ failure to clearly define vote nullification 
affects the legislators’ ability to effectively assert that injury in the 
hypothetical scenario presented in Part II.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that legislators have a legal “interest in maintaining the 
effectiveness of their vote.”259  However, Coleman is the only case 
where the Supreme Court has recognized legislative standing as an 
injury and considered the merits of the case.260 
The hypothetical presented in Part II provides a situation where 
the executive refused to enforce a treaty provision, deeming it non-
self-executing when the Senate at the time of ratification intended 
the provision to be self-executing.261  There is an extremely high 
threshold that the legislators must overcome to prove that the 
effectiveness of their votes has been compromised and that vote 
nullification is an injury sufficient to satisfy standing requirements.262  
For example, the senators must show that they had enough votes to 
shift the outcome of the vote one way, but the outcome was 
inconsistent with that vote.263  This is not to suggest that at least sixty-
seven senators who voted to ratify a treaty must be parties to the suit; 
                                                 
 258. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 97 (“[T]he zone of interests requirement is 
used only in statutory cases, usually involving administrative law issues.”). 
 259. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939). 
 260. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text (discussing Coleman as the 
basis for a claim of legislative standing). 
 261. See supra Part II (providing a hypothetical that forms the basis of a claim of 
vote nullification). 
 262. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814, 829 (1997) (denying a claim of 
legislative standing where federal legislators argued that the executive’s ability to 
cancel spending and tax benefit measures after he had signed them into law 
constituted vote nullification). 
 263. Compare Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436–37 (recognizing vote nullification as an 
injury when all twenty state senators who voted against ratification sued, joined by 
one other senator and three state house members, and where the vote at issue was a 
twenty-twenty tie in the state senate), with Raines, 521 U.S. at 814 (rejecting the claim 
of vote nullification where only four senators and two congressmen sued and the 
outcome of the vote was determined by a thirty-eight vote margin in the Senate and a 
fifty-five vote margin in the House). 
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instead any plaintiff must be able to show that he successfully voted 
for one outcome but the opposite outcome was effectuated.264 
Like the legislators in Coleman, the senators in the hypothetical 
suffered the concrete injury of vote nullification because they have a 
“plain, direct, and adequate” interest in maintaining the effectiveness 
of their vote establishing a treaty provision as self-executing.265  When 
the executive undermined the senators’ interest in protecting the 
effectiveness of their votes by refusing to enforce the treaty 
obligation, the senators sustained an injury identical to the injury 
suffered by the legislators in Coleman.266 
Specifically, in the hypothetical, when the senators voted to ratify 
the treaty, they understood that the treaty required the executive 
branch to take specific action.267  Their vote to ratify the treaty would 
have been, at least in part, contingent upon an expectation that the 
executive branch would carry out the required action.268  The 
executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty obligation completely 
undermined the purpose and effectiveness of the senators’ vote, thus 
placing the senators in a situation similar to the legislators in Coleman 
and Kennedy.269 
                                                 
 264. See, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 (declining legislators’ analogy between their 
case and Coleman because “[t]hey have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, 
that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless 
deemed defeated”).  The Court based the determination that the plaintiff-legislators 
were not sufficiently injured to establish standing not on the number of plaintiffs, 
but on the fact that they appeared to be attempting to reverse a political loss through 
the judicial branch.  Id. 
 265. Cf. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (granting standing to senators claiming vote 
nullification where executive action completely undermined the effectiveness of 
their votes against the ratification of a constitutional amendment). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Cf. id. (acknowledging an injury where an insufficient number of senators 
voted to ratify a constitutional amendment but the state endorsed ratification despite 
that, undermining the legislature’s expectation that the amendment would not be 
ratified). 
 268. The Senate often explicitly states whether or not it intends a treaty to be self-
executing when it is considering the treaty for ratification, suggesting that it is a 
factor in the decision.  See, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-8, at 3 (2003) (commenting that 
“[n]o separate implementing legislation is necessary for this purpose” with regard to 
the Montreal Convention). 
 269. Compare Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438 (finding vote nullification where half of the 
state senate voted against ratifying a constitutional amendment but the amendment 
was ratified despite the vote), and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (recognizing vote nullification where the both chambers of Congress voted to 
pass legislation but it was not implemented by the executive), with Raines, 521 U.S. at 
829 (rejecting a claim of vote nullification in a challenge of the executive’s 
application of legislation overwhelmingly passed in both chambers), and Campbell v. 
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The situation facing the hypothetical senators also satisfies the post-
Raines legislative standing considerations discussed in Chenowith and 
Campbell because the executive’s refusal to enforce the treaty 
obligation completely nullified the senators’ votes.270  The senators’ 
claim would survive for the same reason that the Chenowith court 
suggested the Kennedy holding was valid:  the executive’s refusal to 
recognize properly approved legislative action constitutes complete 
nullification of the votes to pass that legislation.271  In the 
hypothetical, the senators voted to require the executive to recognize 
the treaty as self-executing, and his refusal is equivalent to the 
inappropriate pocket veto in Kennedy.272 
Further, the executive’s refusal to recognize the treaty as self-
executing is complete nullification based on Justice Randolph’s 
concurrence in Campbell.273  In the hypothetical, the senators required 
the executive to view the treaty term as self-executing through their 
approval of the treaty; the executive’s refusal to effectuate that treaty 
term means that the senators’ votes were “for naught.”274  Applying 
the analysis invoked by Judge Randolph:  “in the language of Raines,” 
the hypothetical senators had sufficient votes to pass the treaty with a 
self-executing term, but this legislative action did not go “‘into 
                                                 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying legislative standing where the 
executive’s action was only tangentially related to legislative votes). 
 270. See Chenowith v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
that an unconstitutional pocket veto of legislation duly passed by Congress could 
satisfy the Raines complete nullification requirement); see also Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 
(Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing that if legislation prohibiting executive action 
had passed both chambers and the executive had taken the action regardless, the 
legislators would have a valid claim of complete nullification). 
 271. See Chenowith, 181 F.3d at 116–17 (arguing that Kennedy would probably satisfy 
the narrow vote nullification requirements implemented by the Court in Raines 
because it was sufficiently similar to Coleman). 
 272. See id. at 117 (finding that the pocket veto in Kennedy constituted complete 
nullification because it was the executive’s action that “prevented the bill from 
becoming law” instead of a lack of legislative support). 
 273. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (suggesting that if the 
President had declared war despite Congress’s rejection of the declaration of war the 
legislators would have standing because the actions they voted to prohibit were 
executed anyway, thus nullifying the effectiveness of their votes). 
 274. Cf. id. (positing that if the President had taken action inconsistent with 
Congress’s rejection of the declaration of war, the legislative votes would have been 
rendered meaningless). 
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effect.’”275  This basis is sufficient to grant the senators standing based 
on a claim of vote nullification.276 
Unlike the situation in Raines, recognizing legislative standing is 
the last (and only) resort to limiting the assertion of the executive in 
the hypothetical.277  The senators’ standing claim is strengthened by 
the fact that there is no viable alternate remedy for the legislators.278  
In the hypothetical, legislative recourse would be unlikely because 
implementing legislation would have to pass both chambers and 
survive executive consideration.279  This is an unreasonable 
expectation because ratification only requires consideration from the 
Senate.280  Further, a court would likely recognize legislative standing 
because no private party could challenge the executive’s action.281  | 
It would be extremely difficult for a private individual to prove the 
injury, causation, and redressability elements of Article III standing in 
the hypothetical.282 
C. Legislators Seeking a Judicial Solution to Executive Action Under 
Medellín Can Avoid Raising a Non-Justiciable Political Question 
A suit to challenge the executive’s inaction in this situation would 
not raise a political question that the courts would be unable or 
                                                 
 275. See id. (considering a step-by-step application of the Raines requirements for 
vote nullification to the legislators’ claim). 
 276. Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(determining that the executive’s refusal to implement duly passed legislation was 
vote nullification), with Campbell, 203 F.3d at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the vote nullification claim was unfounded because the executive action was not 
sufficiently related to the legislative action). 
 277. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (implying that if there was no 
other opportunity to challenge the line item veto the outcome of the case might have 
been different and that the legislative standing question certainly would have been 
considered differently). 
 278. See id. (suggesting that since members of Congress could repeal the Line 
Item Veto Act or remove appropriation bills from the measure’s scope, they have 
other opportunities for recourse).  But see Campbell, 203 F.3d at 32 (Randolph, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the general ability to vote for or against new legislation in 
response to executive action does not negate legislative standing for a claim of vote 
nullification). 
 279. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the hurdles to the 
enactment of the Senate’s intent); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing for 
the presentment and enactment of legislation and enumerating the veto override 
process). 
 280. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating the treaty-making process). 
 281. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (suggesting that when a private party can 
challenge the constitutionality of an act, the Court should not unnecessarily 
intercede in the dispute between the political branches). 
 282. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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unwilling to answer.  Specifically, the legislators would seek an 
injunctive order compelling executive action.283  The overarching 
issue in the suit would be whether the treaty term was self-executing; 
essentially it would be the same type of treaty interpretation in which 
the Court has regularly engaged.284 
In reviewing whether an issue raises a nonjusticiable political 
question, courts generally apply the six-part Baker test.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized that some of the elements are more important 
and clearly supported than others.285  Applying the Baker test to the 
hypothetical scenario above proves that a legislative suit would not 
raise an issue violating the political question doctrine.286 
First, the Constitution does not commit resolution of this issue to 
one of the political departments.  In determining whether the 
Constitution textually commits the resolution of the issue to a 
political branch, the Court must interpret the constitutional grant of 
treaty-making powers—specifically the Treaty Clause.287  The Treaty 
Clause authorizes the executive to make treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.288  The Treaty Clause does not mention treaty 
interpretation.289  The only clause that could be read to encompass 
treaty interpretation is the Supremacy Clause.290  The Supremacy 
Clause does not expressly state that one branch must enforce or 
                                                 
 283. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 284. For example, in Foster v. Neilson, the Court found that specific terms in the 
Adams-Onís treaty were not judicially enforceable absent implementing legislation.  
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).  Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Percheman, the 
Court overruled Foster and held that the terms in the Adams-Onís treaty addressed in 
that case were in fact self-executing based on the Spanish-language version of the 
treaty.  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833).  And recently, in Medellín v. Texas, the 
Court interpreted the text of the provisions of the U.N. Charter to determine that 
ICJ decisions were not domestically enforceable without implementing legislation.  
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358–60 (2008). 
 285. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (stating that the political 
question tests as listed in Baker “are probably listed in descending order of both 
importance and certainty”). 
 286. See supra notes 172–182 and accompanying text (discussing the political 
question doctrine and listing the factors in the Baker test). 
 287. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969) (establishing that review 
of a textual commitment requires an interpretation of relevant constitutional 
language).  In Powell, the Court rejected the argument that the ability of Congress to 
exclude members was a nonjusticiable political issue because the Constitution allows 
Congress to judge the qualifications of its own members.  Id. at 522. 
 288. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (suggesting that treaties carry the same weight as 
the Constitution and the laws made pursuant to the Constitution). 
  
2010] THE POST-MEDELLÍN CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE STANDING 773 
 
interpret the efficacy of treaties.291  Based on a reading of the Treaty 
Clause and the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution does not relegate 
the final word in treaty interpretation to a political branch.  In fact, 
one could argue that the judicial branch is the division of 
government to which the Constitution has relegated that power.292 
Second, the judiciary would be perfectly capable of discovering and 
managing a standard to resolve the issue raised in the hypothetical.  
To satisfy the second Baker requirement, the Court must resolve the 
issue by setting forth clear rules.293  Additionally, at least to some 
extent, future courts must be able to effectively rely on the test 
enunciated by the Court.294  Because the issue raised in the 
hypothetical is ultimately one of treaty interpretation, courts have 
already discovered and established a manageable—if not reliable—
standard to resolve the issue.295 
Third, there is not a policy question at issue in the hypothetical; 
instead, the question is simply whether the treaty term is self-
executing and whether the executive must act in accordance with the 
treaty obligation.  In attempting to clarify this element of the Baker 
test, courts have indicated that where rendering a decision requires 
the balancing of a variety of social or political interests, that decision 
is barred as a nonjusticiable policy determination.296  In the 
hypothetical, the balancing of political or social interests would not 
be necessary because that would have been conducted by the 
executive in drafting the treaty and the legislature in consenting to 
the treaty.297  Instead, the court would only have to determine 
                                                 
 291. See id. 
 292. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006) (stating that 
treaty interpretation “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department, headed by the one supreme Court”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)  
(“If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of 
each.”). 
 293. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (arguing that the laws 
established by the courts must be “principled, rational, and based upon reasonable 
distinctions”). 
 294. See id. at 281–82 (rejecting an earlier test and finding that gerrymandering 
claims are nonjusticiable on political grounds because the earlier test was 
unmanageable in that other courts could not rely on the test). 
 295. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (applying a text-based 
treaty interpretation aimed at discovering the intent of the parties to the treaty). 
 296. See, e.g., Smith v. Babcock, 19 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he balancing 
of the relevant interests is quintessentially a political question most appropriately 
resolved by the elected branches of government.”). 
 297. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that certain foreign policy 
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whether the parties to the treaty intended the term to be self-
executing based on the text of the treaty and the other elements 
discussed in Medellín.298 
The final three elements in the Baker test do not merit 
independent consideration; they are the least important and least 
certain aspects of the test.299  In reviewing an issue for its justiciability 
under the political question doctrine, the Court has glossed over 
these three tests.300  Further, relying on that position, an issue is likely 
to fail one of those three tests only in the most extreme situations.301  
Foreign policy and treaty making are not inherently categorized as 
one of those extreme situations.302  In Powell, the Court rejected 
claims of nonjusticiability per the final three tests by citing the 
judicial branch’s constitutional authority.303  Consistent with that 
standard, resolving disputes between the legislature and the executive 
over the interpretation of a treaty to the detriment of one branch’s 
position would not fail one of the final three Baker tests.304 
In Raines, the Court suggested that if there were no alternate 
means to address the issue in that case, the outcome might have been 
                                                 
interests may require initial consideration from a political branch and thus could 
raise a nonjusticiable political issue for courts). 
 298. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant aspects of a 
treaty for the purposes of interpreting the treaty-makers’ intent). 
 299. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (discussing the final three Baker tests:  the inability of 
a court to decide the issue without eroding the respect due the other branches of 
government, an unusual need for adherence to a political decision already made, 
and the potential for embarrassment as a result of differing conclusions by each 
department). 
 300. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969) (addressing the final 
five Baker tests in two cursory paragraphs after addressing the first test for nearly 
thirty pages). 
 301. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The fourth through 
sixth Baker factors appear to be relevant only if judicial resolution of a question 
would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts 
where such contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental 
interests.”). 
 302. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (arguing that the fact that a case 
addresses a matter of foreign policy does not automatically make it nonjusticiable). 
 303. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549 (“Our system of government requires that federal 
courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the 
construction given the document by another branch.  The alleged conflict that such 
an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional 
responsibility.”). 
 304. Cf. U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 
76, 104 (D.D.C. 1998) (resolving a dispute between the legislature and the executive 
regarding the census without causing undue disrespect to a political branch, 
breaching an unusual need for adherence to an existing political decision, or 
producing multifarious statements on the issue). 
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different.305  Specifically, the Raines Court indicated that Congress 
could legislate its way out of the problem or a private party could sue 
for the injury.306  In the hypothetical scenario, there would be no 
sufficient alternative to restore the value of the Senate’s vote to ratify 
a self-executing treaty term other than granting legislators standing 
to sue for vote nullification.307  The Senate could not simply legislate 
around the issue because any bill would need support from the 
House and the President; specifically, traditional legislation would 
have to cross a different threshold than treaty ratification.308  
Additionally, due to the abstract nature of the injury, no private party 
would be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III 
standing based on the facts of the hypothetical.309 
Courts should recognize legislators’ standing in this situation 
because the best way to equalize the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches in light of the Medellín holding 
would be for courts to recognize legislative standing in instances 
where Congress challenges the executive’s refusal to enforce a 
treaty.310  It would then be the duty of the judiciary to interpret the 
treaty provision or the implementing legislation to determine if the 
terms of the treaty were self-executing.311  The courts are perfectly 
                                                 
 305. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (recognizing that Congress 
could take legislative steps to remedy the plaintiffs’ complaint or another party could 
have a constitutional challenge to the case). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text (addressing barriers to 
alternative methods of challenging executive action). 
 308. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate for treaty ratification), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring that 
legislation pass both chambers of Congress and be approved by the executive or that 
both chambers vote to supersede the executive’s veto by a two-thirds vote). 
 309. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1223–24 (arguing that based on Article III 
standing limitations, courts should only hear cases as a “last resort” and when a 
decision is consistent with separation of powers and appropriate for judicial 
consideration); see also Paul Alexander Fortenberry & Daniel Canton Beck,  
Chief Justice Roberts—Constitutional Interpretations of Article III and the Commerce Clause:  
Will the “Hapless Toad” and “John Q. Public” Have Any Protection in the Roberts Court?,  
13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 55, 73 (2005) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts opposes 
citizen suits to the extent that they force the courts to take action constitutionally 
assigned to the executive).  But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–21 (2007) 
(recognizing standing for a state’s challenge of the EPA’s failure to enforce the 
Clean Air Act while acknowledging that states receive unique standing considerations 
in some situations). 
 310. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that legislators in the hypothetical would satisfy 
both traditional and legislative standing requirements). 
 311. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 953, 957 (1994) (“[O]ur courts have a duty to interpret treaties.”). 
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capable of undertaking this level of analysis as evidenced by Medellín 
and countless other cases in the Supreme Court and lower courts.312 
D. If Courts Refuse to Recognize Legislative Standing in the Situation 
Created By Medellín, Alternate Steps Would Be Available  
to the Legislative Branch 
If courts do refuse to grant the hypothetical senators’ standing, 
there are other, possibly futile, steps that Congress could take in 
trying to implement its intent.  First, Congress could try to pass 
legislation that clarifies the body’s intent with regard to the treaty or 
the provision.313  As traditional legislation, this, of course, would be 
subject to presidential veto, and if the executive was acting contrary 
to legislative intent, it is unlikely that he would sign legislation forcing 
him to alter his course of action.314  Reversing the President’s veto in 
this situation would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers, a 
significant constitutional hurdle.315 
Alternatively, Congress could use its legislative powers—such as the 
budget and appropriations process or its investigative role—as 
persuasive tools to change the executive’s course of action.316  Finally, 
either chamber of Congress could sue as an entire body challenging 
the President’s enforcement of the treaty provision.317  Each of the 
above steps would require a higher level of support than the actual 
vote to ratify the treaty, and they do not qualify as suitable alternatives 
to legislative standing under Raines.318 
                                                 
 312. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1392–93 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(listing cases where the Supreme Court has determined that a treaty term was self-
executing); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326(2) (1987) (“Courts . . . have final authority to interpret an international 
agreement . . . .”).  See generally Bederman, supra note 311, at 955–63 (discussing the 
courts’ constitutional obligation to interpret treaties). 
 313. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (establishing the legislative powers of Congress 
and requiring presentment). 
 314. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to 
enactment against the executive’s will). 
 315. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (enumerating the veto and veto override 
process). 
 316. See Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (identifying legislative powers that serve as a check on 
the executive). 
 317. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,  
11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 82 (D.D.C. 1998) (acknowledging the House of Representative’s 
standing to sue and challenge the Census Bureau’s use of statistical sampling in the 
census as inconsistent with the Census Act). 
 318. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., 
concurring) (contending that under Raines, just because Congress can vote on the 
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The best alternate course of action for Congress would be to 
preemptively pass legislation recognizing and defining the injury of 
vote nullification.319  Under some interpretations of the doctrine of 
prudential standing, Congress can control the scope of the cases that 
courts consider by defining the injury and causation elements.320   
If Congress created a clearly defined injury, the courts may even relax 
certain elements of Article III standing.321  However, some view the 
doctrine of prudential standing as an additional limit within Article 
III standing and would reject congressional efforts to expand 
standing under that doctrine to a claim that did not meet the Article 
III requirements.322 
CONCLUSION 
Medellín increased executive power to the extent that presidential 
action can undermine the votes of members of Congress, thus 
establishing legislative standing for those members.  The holding 
shifted the balance of power towards the executive by creating a 
presumption that treaties are non-self-executing.323  The Roberts 
Court developed the presumption by holding that unless the text of a 
treaty clearly indicates that self-execution was the intent of the 
parties, the treaty is non-self-executing.324  The shift in power allows 
                                                 
issue in the future does not automatically mean that an earlier vote on the same issue 
has not been nullified). 
 319. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007) (recognizing a lower 
threshold to satisfy redressability and immediacy requirements when a party asserts a 
procedural right). 
 320. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (arguing that legislation could 
relax the Article III standing elements). 
 321. See generally John D. Echevarria, Critiquing Laidlaw:  Congressional Power to 
Confer Standing and the Irrelevance of Mootness Doctrine to Civil Penalties, 11 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 287, 295–301 (2001) (addressing the Court’s modern approach to 
recognizing congressionally created rights of action under Article III); Martin 
Kellner, Congressional Grants of Standing in Administrative Law and Judicial Review:  
Proposing a New Standing Doctrine from a Delegation Perspective, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 315, 
328–33 (2007) (discussing Congress’s ability to create a case or controversy by 
passing laws creating legal rights). 
 322. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (suggesting that Article III 
standing requirements establish a ceiling for justiciable claims). 
 323. See supra Part III (discussing the establishment of a presumption of non-self-
execution). 
 324. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (basing the treaty review 
on an analysis of the text and requiring some textual indicia of intent that the treaty 
be self-executing). 
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the executive to make the final determination of whether a treaty is 
domestically enforceable.325 
Members of the legislature have limited opportunities to respond 
to an executive who interprets a treaty provision differently than the 
Senate intended.  If members of the Senate sued to force the 
President to execute the treaty obligations consistent with the 
Senate’s intent at the time of ratification, those members would have 
standing.326  Senators challenging the executive’s inaction would 
satisfy the traditional Article III requirements of standing because 
they would be able to assert a concrete injury, show causation, and 
satisfy redressability standards.327  The senators’ claim would not raise 
any prudential standing concerns because it is not a third party claim, 
a generalized grievance, or within the purview of a statute.328 
The senators would also overcome the specific barriers created by 
their role as legislators.  The senators in the hypothetical would claim 
an injury sufficient to overcome the barriers associated with legislative 
standing.329  Specifically, the legislators would be able to effectively 
assert a claim of vote nullification because executive inaction would 
completely undermine the effectiveness of their votes to ratify the 
treaty as self-executing.330  Further, the legislative suit would not raise 
a nonjusticiable political question.331 
In the end, courts should recognize legislative standing in the 
hypothetical situation.  However, if they do not, the legislature has 
other options in checking the type of executive action presented in 
the hypothetical.  For example, both chambers could sue as an entity, 
vote to withhold funding, or pass implementing legislation.332  
Alternatively, Congress could attempt to expand the scope of 
                                                 
 325. See supra Part II (presenting a hypothetical situation where the executive 
refuses to enforce treaty provisions). 
 326. See supra Part IV.A (applying the hypothetical to the traditional standing test). 
 327. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (enumerating 
the requirements for Article III standing). 
 328. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability 
of prudential standing). 
 329. See supra Part IV.B (considering the requirements for legislative standing). 
 330. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (recognizing that legislators 
have an interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes). 
 331. See supra Part IV.C (addressing the relevance of the political question 
doctrine in light of the hypothetical). 
 332. See supra Part IV.D (considering alternate possibilities for legislators to 
respond to an executive’s expansion of power). 
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legislative standing by passing legislation recognizing a cause of 
action for vote nullification.333 
If Congress is barred from asserting a vote nullification claim in 
light of the Medellín holding, the Court will have significantly 
increased executive power.  The only way to maintain an appropriate 
balance of power in treaty enforcement is either for courts to 
recognize vote nullification or for Congress to step forward and 
protect its powers in advance. 
                                                 
 333. See supra notes 320–322 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of 
creating a cause of action through legislation). 
